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Coalitions, Developing Countries, and International Trade: Research Findings and Prospects

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Abstract. Developing countries increasingly invest in coalition building to effect gains in international trade negotiations. This essay reviews recent literature on coalitions to assess its contribution to our understanding of the causes, types, and effectiveness of developing country coalitions. In particular, the global diffusion of power is discussed as an important dynamic affecting coalitions in trade negotiations. Our understanding of how these coalitions operate would be strengthened by paying attention to the derivation of state interests, rather than specifying them exogenously, and to the negotiation tactics that states use when working in coalitions.

Keywords: developing countries, coalition types, coalition effectiveness, international alliances, diffusion of power.

Introduction

Recent literature on international trade negotiation accords considerable attention to the ways in which developing countries increasingly coalesce to effect gains for themselves in negotiation, mostly with the developed world. This is both appropriate and important: from the Uruguay Round to the Doha Round, coalitions have facilitated the gains (and, at times, the losses) made by the weak against the strong. This essay examines two works in particular – Amrita Narlikar’s (2003) *International Trade and Developing Countries: Bargaining Coalitions in the GATT & WTO* (hereafter, ‘International Trade’) and John Odell’s edited collection *Negotiating Trade: Developing Countries in the WTO and NAFTA* (2006). Coalitions here refer to cooperation and coordina-

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tion among groups of countries in which the members are cognizant of their collective existence (Narlikar 2003: 31). Drahos (2003) opts for the simpler terminology of informal and formal groups in referring to coalitions.

The literature on developing country coalitions makes major contributions in detailing three aspects of coalitions: causes, types, and effectiveness. How this research can be expanded and deepened is addressed in this article as well as in my own research (Singh 2000 and forthcoming). For expansion, I suggest paying careful attention to the diffusion of power context in which coalitions operate, as opposed to a hierarchically defined concentration of power that allows them fewer options. The way states derive their national interests and the way they practice negotiation tactics and strategies while operating in coalitions will deepen our understanding. The expansive and deepening aspects of my argument in this essay are related to the two issues of most concern to coalitions in Narlikar's *International Trade*: 'external balance' and 'internal cohesion or bargaining,' respectively.

In politics, it is not surprising that like, or even disparate, interests form groups or coalitions outside of the institutions that both shape as well as respond to these interests. Political scientists study this phenomenon in a variety of ways – interest groups, political parties, social movements, political coalitions and networks, and guerilla movements, to name a few. However, our understanding of developing country coalitions at an international level is still lacking for three interrelated reasons. First, traditional political science often ignores international negotiation in general in considering international power relations or institutions. Negotiations are mentioned in passing without providing any depth or insights. The role of negotiation, bargaining or diplomacy is a frequent incantation in outlining interest convergence or divergence, but details are seldom provided. Most of these analyses assume that power structures are constant and then proceed to explain the way negotiation leads to interest convergence. Therefore, international negotiation theorists are still struggling to make a case that negotiation matters in international trade, given power structures or institutions (Odell 2000, Zartman 2000). Only in the last decade or so have theorists analyzed micro-issues in economic negotiation systematically, such as coalition building. Second, in making the case that negotiation matters, theorists in general often turn to weak-strong negotiations in which the weak make gains that traditional political science cannot predict with its emphasis on power structures. Most of these contributions examine bilateral or trilateral (between two great powers) scenarios. As coalitions form in multilateral contexts, they are not captured in these analyses. Lastly, it can be argued that effective coalition building – centered on issues and backed by technical skills – among the developing world states is new.

Zartman (1971: ix) noted 35 years ago that the global distribution of power situated the developing world in a “definitional inferiority.” Under these circumstances, whether the developing world formed coalitions or not did not matter. Winham (1986: 377) argued in the context of the GATT’s Tokyo Round (1973–79) that even in coalitions, the developing world missed the purpose of international negotiation: “The developing countries tend to make revolutionary demands on the developed countries, and negotiation is not an appropriate method to achieve revolutionary demands.”

Narlikar’s *International Trade* situates its main claim in the new type of coalition-building that started *after* the Tokyo Round. First, she notes, that the Uruguay Round (1986–94) and the process leading up to it, especially from the 1982 Ministerial onwards, represented a new type of ‘coalitional diplomacy’ as the developing world began to rely more on research on issues than ideology to inform its positions. Second, she argues that the entry of services on the GATT agenda was especially important for this new type of coalitional diplomacy. Services began to feature issue-based, sub-sectoral, and crossover coalitions that the developing world had not addressed before. Issues here refer to major issues, such as services, intellectual property, agriculture and manufacturing. Sub-sectoral coalitions refer to sub-issues (for example, tourism or professional services). Crossover coalitions refer to coalitions encompassing developed and developing countries. Narlikar (2003), Drahos (2003), and Odell (2006) claim that coalition-building provides developing countries clout *if* done effectively. Most of the literature provides detailed case study analyses of the various types of coalitions and their possible effectiveness. Table 1 enumerates a few of the important developing world coalitions described in *International Trade*, as well as in Bilal and Szepesi (2005: 391–393).

Scholars of developing country coalitions have addressed the causes, types and effectiveness of coalitions in trade negotiations and the challenges we face as the research agenda is expanded. While a grand theory of negotiation, as Odell (2000) notes, or one for coalitions, as Narlikar (2003: 17) notes, may not be possible, the onus is on negotiation scholars to be thorough, rigorous, and creative in their analyses, claims and conclusions.

Causes of Coalitions

Material interests domestically and socialization dynamics internationally stand out as the two primary factors driving coalition formation. Noting the processes and interactions through which this happens is the strength of the

*Table 1: Major Coalitions Including Developing Countries
(Listed more or less chronologically)*

G10 (Uruguay Round): Hardline developing countries led by Brazil and India opposed to inclusion of new issues (services, intellectual property) on the agenda. Bloc coalition in Narlikar's (2003) terminology.

G20 (Uruguay Round): Moderate developing countries led by Colombian Ambassador Felipe Jaramillo who supported the negotiation process in services. An issue-based alliance.

Café au lait: nickname of a crossover coalition including G20 and G9 (moderate developed countries) that broke the deadlock at the Uruguay Round with the Swiss-Colombian text, therefore the name of the coalition.

Cairns Group (Uruguay and Doha Rounds): a crossover coalition of 17 countries including developed and developing countries that push for offensive interests in agriculture.

Like-Minded Group: Developing countries opposed to inclusion of Singapore issues on the Doha Round agenda. They also pushed for special and differential treatment and credits for autonomous liberalization. A bloc-type coalition.

G20 (Doha Round): A group that varies in strength from 19–22 but called G20, led by Brazil and India. It pushed for agricultural reform and brought together offensive and defensive interests. Narlikar (2003) calls it a smart coalition in bringing together old-style bloc diplomacy with new research and issue-based alliance politics.

G33 (Doha Round): A group of developing countries asking for certain agricultural products to be self-certified by developing countries as 'special products' and 'special safeguard mechanism' and exempt from some forms of tariff reduction formulas being applied.

G90 (Doha Round): An umbrella group of least developed countries, which includes the ACP (Asia, Caribbean, Pacific) group that extended preferential access with EU through the Cotonou Agreement, and African Group that includes most of the countries of the African Union.

Group on Cotton (Doha Round – Cancun Ministerial): Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali. Pushing for elimination of cotton subsidies in developed countries.

G5 (Doha Round): United States, European Union, Brazil, India and Australia. G5 meets regularly to try to break the frequent deadlocks in the Doha Round, mostly over agriculture.

Source: Narlikar (2003); Bilal and Szepesi (2005)

current literature. Connecting it with the underlying conditions of power more explicitly will provide it heft.

Narlikar's *International Trade* provides an excellent summary of the economics and international relations literatures that deal with alliance formation. Although economics deals with coalitions in the domestic context only, it nevertheless describes the circumstances under which scarce factors or defensive interests stimulate formation of protectionist coalitions and abundant factors or offensive interests produce a free trade oriented-coalition.¹ Rogowski (1987, 1989) applied factor specificity in the doctrine of comparative advantage to the formation of political coalitions in this regard. The Ricardo-Viner model went a step further in showing that it may not be particular factors but entire industries that are protectionist or free trade oriented. Narlikar's argument demonstrates that these 'domestic' theories of coalition can instruct us on the material basis of coalitional interests. We can go a step further and learn, as scholars and negotiators, the political possibilities arising from the dynamics of coalition formation that go beyond factors or industries (Gourevtich 1986, Rogowski 1989, Milner 1997). These include the use of political entrepreneurship and interest adjustment and containment. Bismarck's Iron-Rye coalition is an example (Rogowski 1989).

The second set of material theories, apart from those in economics, is derived primarily from traditional international relations theory. Coalitional interests emanate from the hierarchy of capabilities in the international system. It would be natural for the weak to form a coalition to either confront or extract concessions from the strong (see Zartman 1971, 1987). Liberal internationalist theories also assert the role of international organizations in providing particular incentives for coalition formation. Drahos (2003: 85-87) writes that coalitions arise in the WTO because the organization works through consensus and coalitions can facilitate that outcome by grouping member states. Narlikar (2003: 25) cites international negotiators in noting that it was easier to form coalitions in UN organizations, where countries could issue declarative statements versus GATT, which aimed for contractual obligations. This would account for the G-77 advocacy that later led to calls for the New International Economic Order in 1974 at the UN General Assembly followed by calls for a New World Information and Communication Order at UNESCO in 1976.

We need to go beyond material interests, derived domestically or through the international system, to understand coalition causes. Being marginalized from the centers of powers left the developing world with no choice but to engage in ideological fights (Winham 1986), ask for special protections (Zartman 1971), form confrontational coalitions (Singh 2000), or engage in

old bloc-style diplomacy (Narlikar 2003). These are among the weapons of the weak, as Scott (1987) tells us eloquently, in the context of peasantry interacting with landlords. At the level of the international system in the 1960s, the material basis of coalitions reflected factor specificity, for sure, but also helplessness and anger from the post-colonial world as it dealt with hunger, deprivation and disease. There was also sophisticated well-informed advocacy back then. The Prebisch-Singer model of distorted terms of trade and Bhagwati's model of immiserizing growth helped convince the developing world elite that GATT would not be of much help to it.² Raul Prebisch led the way up (literally way up from GATT) to found UNCTAD. The formation of UNCTAD made the developing world confident of winning in other venues, like the UN General Assembly and UNESCO.

Narlikar's *International Trade* goes beyond material factors but here the analysis could be deeper. She notes the contribution made by constructivist scholars that they help us understand why developing countries choose the allies they do. In other words, material factors at the domestic level define state interests; the international system defines state allies. Like-minded states with a common identity find it easy to come together. But the point made by constructivist scholars is broader than that. For Wendt (1999), for example, there are no material factors, only epistemic understandings that not only define state interests but also their behavior (in this case, it would be coalition formation). In Wendt's often quoted terms, it is "ideas all the way down." Narlikar (2003) makes a compelling case that ideas or identities matter for choosing allies but she needs to also tell us why they do not matter for anything else.

International socialization or construction of interests can play a causal role, either as a primary cause or as a sufficient condition, depending on our analytical lens, in providing the impetus for coalition formation itself. Interests may very well be defined wholly or partially by the international system, too. It is unclear why Narlikar (2003) takes state interests as a given or defined by societal factors alone.³ Finnemore (1996) shows that national interests often reflect international norm dynamics. International networking theories, in particular, make a compelling case that international networks (many of which would approximate the definition of coalitions themselves) help to define interests. Keck and Sikkink (1998) make this case for transnational human rights and environmental networks. Sell (1997, 2003) notes that the multinational enterprises-driven Intellectual Property Coalition persuaded much of the developed world that its interest was in stringent property rights protection. Finally constructivist and non-constructivist scholars argue that states often do not know their interests and they come to know them only through negotiation. Raiffa (1982: Part IV) noted that this is especially the case in multilateral nego-

tiation where preferences are less well-known and it may be even hard at times for one party to know who its opposing party is. Peterson (2004) shows that participation in international negotiation can help to define state interests. I have made a similar case for services for the developing world: participation in the services talks helped to change developing country interests from defensive to offensive (Singh 2006).

In providing empirical evidence for the mix of material and ideational factors that lead to coalitions, Narlikar's *International Trade* rightly begins by noting the importance of context in tracing the rise of coalitions within the developing world. The first context is that of advocacy, which follows from opposing the moves to include new issues such as services and intellectual property on the Uruguay Round agenda. The developing world viewed services – intangible products that make up flows of telecommunications, finance, tourism, professional services and the like – as high tech-based and driven by the North's interests. The G10 coalition of developing countries led by India and Brazil fiercely opposed these moves until the Punta del Este declaration opening the Uruguay Round in September 1986. They were confronting the developed country hardliners led by the United States. However, this very context led to the rise of an issue-based, rather than ideology-based, coalition in developing country trade politics. A second contextual issue is the rise of crossover coalitions in which the developed and developing countries come together. The solution to hardline posturing on new issues (services and intellectual property) prior to the Uruguay Round came from the middle-of-the-road Swiss-Colombian text that brought together moderate players from the developing world (known as G-20) as well as developed countries (the G-9) in a coalition known as the *café au lait* coalition after its two protagonists. Later, another crossover coalition, the Cairns Group, mimicked the *café au lait* rationale and applied it to seeking agricultural trade liberalization from the U.S. and the European Community. The contribution made by Narlikar in thinking of the various contexts for both issue-based as well as crossover coalitions, as described above, is remarkable.

Nevertheless, this context is missing an antecedent condition allowing us to answer questions regarding the timing and scope of the coalition. Why didn't the developing world do this before? Was the services agenda so unique that it would change the nature of coalition building or was there another condition present? Raiffa's (1982: Chapter 18) analysis of the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) negotiations from 1973–78 shows, after all, that neither issue-based advocacy nor what Narlikar calls crossover coalitions were new to the developing world. They both existed during UNCLOS, a complex multi-party multi-issue negotiation dealing with

sharing of sea bed resources. Issue-based coalitions during UNCLOS presented claims based in research and a developing country technocrat led the negotiations at the end. Singapore's Ambassador Tommy Koh who led the negotiations in 1978 attempted to resolve deadlocks at UNCLOS by employing a sophisticated model developed by MIT researchers on natural resources.⁴

The newness of the Uruguay Round was in the changed context of power, rather than the new issues (Hoekman and Kostecki 1995; Singh 2000; Singh forthcoming). Until the end of the Tokyo Round, international trade negotiations revealed a hierarchical alignment of states based on their power or resources and capabilities. In such a scenario that I term 'concentration of power,' the strong can do what they can and the weak suffer. However, by the late-1970s, because of developing world advocacy and the corresponding flattening of power distribution at the top with the rise of the European Economic Community and Japan, the developing world could no longer be ignored. This was also clear by the end of the Tokyo Round. It was no surprise then that the 1982 GATT ministerial created the basis of a developing country coalition that would become G-10. Second, the developing world's inclusion had another effect: no longer marginalized from the erstwhile decision-making processes, such as the so-called Green Room where at one time only elite powers met, many from the developing world stopped being confrontational and used moderate tactics to make their case. This may explain the rise of the *café au lait* coalition. In each case, that of G10 as well as *café au lait*, it can be argued that the interests of individual states were defined by a combination of domestic factors and international interactions.

In other words, bringing in context to explain the formulation of international trade coalitions means two things. First, it means defining the type of power distribution or configuration that allows particular types of coalitions to form. Second, it means that other negotiation processes, such as inclusion in decision-making, also lead to the strengthening of particular types of coalitions. Walton et al. (1994) noted that negotiation contexts are always dynamic and that negotiators try to change both the broad terms of their relationship (the "social contract") as well as the process (or substance) of negotiation. In the context of labor-management negotiation, they note that the social contract has changed from arms length transactions to mutual cooperation. Negotiation also now takes place in increasingly pragmatic contexts with a focus on problem-solving.

I argue that *many* international trade negotiations (Singh 2000) now approximate a diffusion or decentralization of power, which can lead to pragmatic bargaining such as mutual problem-solving, technocratic (Narlikar's research-based) tactics, and moderation in ranks. I will turn to these tactics when I detail

coalition effectiveness later. For now, I locate this diffusion of power especially in multilateral contexts, which feature multiple actors and issues, and several types of coalitions that allow negotiators wiggle-room to uncover alternatives. It was this diffusion of power context that led to the G10 and then G20 being formed, rather than just the new issues proposed for the Uruguay Round agenda. In other words, the services issues disposed in these coalitions what power was proposing.

Types of Coalitions

The typology of coalitions developed in *International Trade* is informative, analytical and sensitive to the historic context of the services issue. Narlikar traces the origins of developing country coalitions in the traditional 'bloc-style' diplomacy, which encompassed many issues and brought together states because of shared constructed interests or ideas, a like-mindedness in identity. G10 was a bloc-type coalition. The services issue also led to issue-based coalitions, both within the developing world and in crossover coalitions with the developed world. *Café au lait* epitomized and marked the origins of this 'alliance' type coalition. Since the Uruguay Round, the developing world has mixed and matched these two approaches. Narlikar and Tussie (2004) underscore this in their analysis of the developing country G20 coalition in the Doha Round which sought agriculture reform at the 2003 Cancun WTO ministerial.⁵ They call it a 'smart' coalition that combines the best of bloc-type tactics in bringing like-minded countries together to also practice alliance type issue-based tactics, such as the exchange of research and information among members. Narlikar and Tussie (2004: 948) argue that "G20 is a product of almost two decades of learning by developing countries." The G10 experiment failed them, but the *café au lait* experience also raised the bar. It meant courting developed country partners – not always available – and high transaction costs to participate in coalitional activities in various issues and sub-issues. Many of the LDCs cannot even afford representation in Geneva, let alone keep up with issues. G20 at Cancun brought together the best of both bloc- and alliance-type formations: its leaders – Brazil, China, India – paid the price of collective action in terms of issue-based research and its size offered external balance (against the EU and US) by bringing together the developing world's most-prominent powers.⁶ In general, Drahos (2003: 93) advocates a formal grouping for the developing world to increase their bargaining power; the grouping would find its leadership in prominent developing countries with monitoring and analytical capacity.

Narlikar (2003) and Narlikar and Tussie (2004) seem to favor bloc-type coalitions over issue-based coalitions for several reasons. First, this literature notes that large developing countries have mixed interests, offensive and defensive, often in the same issue-area. They may find it hard to form coalitions for several reasons that accrue to the high opportunity costs of forming issue-based coalitions, usually around liberalization (*café au lait*, for example), with strong defensive interests in the country. I find this problematic and it relates back to my point regarding holding interests constant. Developed countries also face the same dilemma that Narlikar identifies for such countries as Brazil and India, but the developed countries do form issue-based coalitions. Many times, their domestic constituents raise the stakes for them or they learn to define their interests in one direction or the other through successive international interactions. That is how the Intellectual Property Coalition overcame domestic and international opposition and garnered support for its position in the developed world at the TRIPS negotiations during the Uruguay Round. By holding state interests constant, Narlikar finds herself in a theoretical bind. Another way might be to open up the domestic box of interest formation. Both developed and developing countries with extensive domestic consultations learn how to overcome divisions in domestic interests. Even small states have the dilemmas that Narlikar attributes to big states. Costa Rica had to balance its offensive business interests with intensely defensive trade union interests during the tough CAFTA negotiations and reached accommodation through 'cuarto junto,' literally adjacent room negotiations, with businesses and trade unions (Singh 2005). Mauritius decided on a strategy of high-end tourism, as opposed to attracting mass tourists that was deemed difficult for an island nation with high air travel costs, after domestic consultations with the tourist industry (Stoler 2005). Gallagher et al. (2005) note several other cases from the developing world where domestic input and consultations on trade policy and negotiations helped to overcome the differences between offensive and defensive interests. Of course, Narlikar is not off the mark completely either. As the case of agriculture in the EU or US shows, consultations do not always work to overcome opposition. But that is no reason to lay aside democratic alternatives.

Second, *International Trade* notes the high transaction costs for small countries to form sectoral or sub-sectoral negotiations. This point is well-taken in spite of the wealth of success stories that were pointed out earlier. But just because issue-based coalitional politics entail high costs, it still does not mean that bloc-type coalitions are more effective or feasible. One could make a counter argument to lower these transaction costs as is usual for trade capacity building or pooling of regional capacities. For all its weaknesses, CARICOM

did help the Caribbean islands and Belize define their interests in sugar at the Cotonou agreement.

Third, *International Trade* notes that developed country partners often needed for issue-based coalitions to work are not always available. Among the many reasons that the Cairns Group favoring agricultural liberalization weakened or lost influence at the Doha Round was because the United States became increasingly defensive in agriculture. However, this point would also apply to the non-crossover G20, but Narlikar and Tussie hold that to be a success story.

Fourth, Odell and Narlikar (2006) note the many failures of the Like-Minded Group of 13 developing countries (LMG) at Doha that sought to stall the inclusion of Singapore issues at the Doha Ministerial and to call attention to special and differential treatment.⁷ It is not clear with mixed evidence, such as this from LMG and the two points above, why bloc-type coalitions may be *a priori* better despite the high costs of issue-based alliances.

In summary, Narlikar's (2003) typology is convincing and captures the historical complexity of negotiation issues. However, it also raises questions about the relevant road to follow for the future. In terms of the learning taking place, smart coalitions may be the right answer; Drahos' (2003) formal groups with analytical capacities seem to conform to the smart coalition type, too. But, the jury is still out on the relative merits of bloc-type versus issue-based coalitions, regardless of the costs incurred by each side.

Effectiveness of Coalitions

This section analyzes the effectiveness of coalitions at three levels: at the level of the power configuration in which they operate, in terms of negotiation strategies (hawkish versus dovish), and at the micro-level of particular negotiation tactics.

In terms of power configuration, negotiation theories have done a much better job of holding power configurations constant than of analyzing how varying power configurations may lead to differential outcomes.⁸ It is not entirely clear how coalitions operate under various power configurations. The liberal institutionalist belief (Keohane 1984; 2001) that international institutions restrain unbridled power and allow for convergence of interests lacks an understanding of the process of negotiation that allows for differential outcomes under different negotiation contexts.⁹ Coalitions appear to be more effective when there is a diffusion of power than when there is a hierarchical power distribution or a concentration of power. This is the case even for

crossover coalitions with a concentration of power. In the current Internet governance negotiations, there is an almost unanimous international coalition opposing the United States but the latter has not given in. The recently concluded World Information Society Summit (November 2005) ended with the U.S. keeping its advantage with a homegrown corporation, ICANN, based in California and under charter from the US Commerce Department in charge of regulating domain names for the Internet. WSIS had wanted to situate Internet governance in the UN/ITU. The United States also did not give in to the research-informed techno-savvy issue-based coalition in the mid-1990s that opposed liberalization of telecommunications prices. After the negotiations failed, the Federal Communications Commission passed its famous Benchmark Order in August 1997, and the rest of the world, after some kicking and screaming, complied. In both cases, the United States' market power in controlling information network supply gave it preponderant power and coalitions opposing it were deemed ineffective. Both are cases of service-based, sub-issue area coalitions. The reasons these coalitions did not work is not because issue-based coalitions are ineffective but that in certain circumstances, concentrated power still does matter (Singh forthcoming). The broader point is that under most circumstances, however, power does not matter and we should be equally astute in specifying causal factors for differential outcomes under diffusion of power (Singh 2000).

In terms of negotiation strategies, coalitions have the choice of distributive (win-lose) or integrative (mutual gain) strategies. The evidence is mixed: Odell and Sell (2006) and Narlikar and Tussie (2004) show that distributive strategies can work under certain circumstances. However, Narlikar (2003) and Narlikar and Odell (2006) find that distributive strategies did not work for G10 at the Uruguay Round and the Like-Minded Group at the beginning of the Doha Round. It seems that a structured, focused comparison of these contrasting cases might provide answers. Why is there the difference in outcomes? There may be an omitted variable – negotiation tactics. In explaining the differential outcomes between TRIPS and GATS in the North-South negotiations at the Uruguay Round, it was not coalitional tactics but the use of other negotiation tactics that explain the outcomes (Singh 2006). In TRIPS, the developing world faced credible threat and sanctions from the United States. In the case of services, the distributive stance that the developing world took prior to the Uruguay Round gave way slowly to an integrative one as it sat down during the GATS negotiations and conducted some joint-problem solving.

Therefore, the third point regarding effectiveness of coalitions is their relationship to negotiation tactics. While there is hardly an interest that does not

know a coalition, yet each interest is practiced in different ways with a variety of tactics. Narlikar (2003) ends her book by listing several: agenda-setting, research, inclusion, linkages and trade-offs. Narlikar implicitly holds these to be second-order tactics as compared to the chief tactic of coalition-building. It is not clear why that is so. Are coalitions antecedent, necessary or sufficient conditions for the many other tactics to be practiced? Odell and Sell (2006) focus their analysis on the way the public health coalition opposed the pro-TRIPS coalition at the opening of the Doha round and was successful because it framed the issue in terms of public health emergencies. Framing is thus a key causal factor in their analysis. Davis (2003) shows that agricultural liberalization, to the extent that it came about during the Uruguay Round, was due largely to the linkage and trade-offs practiced. The various authors in Agarwal (1998) single out linkage as a primary tactic. Why then are coalitions more important than other negotiation tactics? The theoretical and empirical rationale needs further specification.

Conclusion

The literature on coalition-building among developing countries focuses on an important historical development that needs to be explained and analyzed. Narlikar's analysis is notable with regards to placing it in a theoretical context and providing us with a historically contextualized typology of negotiations. Essays in Odell (2006) are equally sensitive to the varying conditions under which a particular coalitional tactic or overall strategy works, and most of these essays generate further hypotheses.

For future research, two encompassing issues suggested here are: (1) better attention to the underlying power configuration to note the differential impact of coalitions and also to seek a synthesis between power configurations and negotiation processes; and (2) defining rather than taking state interests as a given. This is where constructivist analyses are at their best but, as pointed out above, even classic non-constructivist works from Raiffa (1982) and Walton et al. (1994), *inter alia*, point us in this direction. Finally, we need to think carefully about the efficacy of old versus new types of coalitions and also the tactics and strategies they both practice.

Notes

1. However, we now know empirically that it is easier for defensive interests to come together than large offensive groups benefiting from free trade, such as consumers. This is because small groups can overcome problems of collective action more easily (Olson 1982).

2. Any standard international economics textbook can provide a good summary of these arguments. The Prebisch-Singer model showed that terms of trade would always be aligned against countries making labor intensive products. Bhagwati showed that the more the developing world exported, the less it would earn because of the falling price of its products from oversupply.
3. She is, however, theoretically consistent in noting that behavioral change is not interest alteration (See Moravcsik 1997 on this point). My point is different: interests themselves are defined by the international system in many constructivist accounts.
4. Ambassador Koh's role can be likened to that of another developing country chair to come later, Colombian Ambassador Felipe Jaramillo, who led the services negotiations.
5. G20 at the Doha Round, focused on the agricultural issue, is quite distinct from the services focused G20 at the Uruguay Round.
6. *International Trade* notes in several places the lack of external balance for small developing countries in forming coalitions, a feature over and above the transaction costs they must incur to coalesce. This might account for the lack of an alliance or an issue-based coalition by small island states dependent on international tourism trade.
7. Singapore issues dealt with investment and government procurement practices.
8. Zartman and Rubin (2000) is an exception but it is still not clear why we would get differential outcomes with the same power distribution.
9. There are exceptions here, too, and they are mentioned later in this essay.

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